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CASE NOTE
Federal Taxation-REORGANIZATIONS-DISTRIBUTION
OF BOOTTO
SHAREHOLDERS
OF MERGED
CORPORATION
TAXABLE
AS DIVIDEND,
NOTCAPITAL
GAIN-Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
Mandell Shimberg, Jr., was the majority shareholder of
LaMonte-Shimberg Corporation (LSC), a Florida corporation
involved in home construction and sales. Shimberg, president
and chief executive officer of LSC, owned 66.8% of the LSC
stock.' MGIC Investment Corporation (MGIC) is a Delaware corporation many times the size of LSC, engaged primarily in the
financial guaranty b u ~ i n e s sIn
. ~ 1970 MGIC and LSC executed an
agreement to merge LSC into MGIC in a transaction qualifying
for statutory merger treatment under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
In accordance with the merger agreement, Shimberg exchanged all his LSC stock for cash in the amount of $417,449, plus
21,461 shares of MGIC common stock outright, with an additional 21,461 shares placed in escrow to be delivered in five years
upon satisfactory completion of the contract conditions.~himberg and his wife jointly reported the cash distribution in connection with the merger as long term capital gain. Upon audit the
IRS determined the cash payment was a dividend and was thus
taxable as ordinary income. Accordingly, Shimberg paid a tax
deficiency in the amount of $125,883, with interest totaling
$16,170. Denial of Shimberg's request for refund prompted the
filing of this suit against the government. The district court held
the transaction's net effect was a sale and the cash received was
taxable as a capital gain.4 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
1. Shimberg's wife owned an additional 1.6% of the LSC stock for the benefit of their
children, while the remainder of the stock was owned by 19 unrelated shareholders.
2. As of Oct. 31, 1970, LSC's consolidated balance sheet showed retained earnings of
$724,559, while on Dec. 31, 1970, MGIC reported $34,012,746 in retained earnings.
3. LSC shareholders received pro rata a total of $625,000 in cash, 32,132 shares of
MGIC common stock outright, and another 32,132 shares were placed in escrow for possible future distribution to the LSC stockholders in accordance with a formula based upon
a five-year average of the LSC earnings for the years 1970 through 1974. Prior to the
satisfaction of the earnings requirement and the distribution of the escrowed shares, the
LSC stockholders had no rights with respect to said shares. Brief for Appellee a t 5,
Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476
(U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
4. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), reu'd, 577 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S.Jan. 16, 1979).
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reversed and held the cash payment had the effect of a dividend
distribution5 within the meaning of section 356(a).

Shareholders participating in corporate reorganizations defined in section 368(a)(1) are afforded favorable tax treatment
under section 354. Section 354(a)(1) provides that no gain or loss
will be recognized in reorganizations in which stock is exchanged
solely for stock either (1)in the same corporation or (2) in another
corporation that is a party to the reorganization. If, however, a
shareholder receives money or other property (commonly called
"boot") in an exchange to which section 354 would otherwise
apply, section 356(a)(1) requires that any gain to the recipient be
recognized to the extent of the money and the fair market value
of any property received.
Whether the boot is taxed as capital gain from the sale of a
capital asset or as ordinary income resulting from dividends depends on whether the exchange has the "effect of the distribution
of a dividend" within the meaning of section 356(a)(2).If the boot
has the effect of a dividend distribution, each distributee must
treat as a dividend the amount by which his gain recognized
under section 356(a)(1) does not exceed his ratable share of the
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation. The remainder, if any, of the recognized gain will be taxed as capital
gain from the exchange of pr0perty.l If the payment of boot is'not
considered to have the effect of a dividend, all recognized gain
will receive capital gain treatment.'

A. Dividend Equivalency Principles of Section 302
The phrase "has the effect of the distribution of a dividend"
in section 356(a)(2) is held to be in pari materia with the phrase
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" as used in section 3O2(a)(1)
relating to distributions in stock redemption^.^ Thus, courts have
been willing to apply the principles of dividend equivalency developed under section 302 to reorganizations involving boot under
5. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3476 ( U S . Jan. 16, 1979).
6. I.R.C. 8 356(a)(2).
7. I.R.C. !j 356(a)(1).
8. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). Stock is considered redeemed when a corporation acquires its own stock from a shareholder in exchange
for property.
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section 356.9 The Internal Revenue Service has also taken the
position that "in appropriate cases the tests contained in that
section [302] may serve as useful guidelines for purposes of
applying section 356(a)(2)."lo
Section 302 provides that a distribution made in a stock
redemption will be treated as a capital gain from an exchange for
stock if the redemption satisfies the requirements of section
3O2(b)(l),3OZ(b)(Z), or 3O2(b)(3).I1 Otherwise the redemption is
deemed a dividend, not an exchange, and is induded in the ordinary income of the shareholder to the extent provided in section
301.
A shareholder who is unable to qualify for capital gains under
the objective standards of section 302(b)(2) or 302(b)(3) must
seek relief under section 3O2(b)(1),which applies a subjective test
of whether or not the redemption is essentially equivalent to a
dividend. The section 3O2(b)(1)test for dividend equivalency was
established by the Supreme Court in United States v. DavisJ2
The Court held that a distribution made in redemption of stock
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend if the exchange results
in a "meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the c~rporation."~~
Where, as determined from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the exchange," the distribution does amount to a meaningful reduction, the distribution is
considered an exchange for property and is treated as a capital
gain.
In an effort to identify meaningful reductions in shareholders' proportionate interests in a corporation, the courts and the
Service have considered three factors: (1) the right to vote and
thereby exercise control, (2) the right to participate in current
earnings and accumulated surplus, and (3) the right to share in
the net assets on liquidation.15 "A redemption which reduces
9. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973); King Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 520-21 (Ct. C1. 1969); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp.
793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
10. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121, 122.
11. Congress created a statutory safe harbor for capital gain treatment in Q 302(b)(2)(3). A stock redemption qualifies for capital gain treatment under the "substantially
disproportionate" test of paragraph (2) if both (a) the shareholder's postredemption interest in the corporation is less than 80% of his preredemption interest and (b) the shareholder owns less than 50% of the corporation's voting power after the redemption. Section
3O2(b)(3) allows capital gain treatment when the corporation redeems all the shareholder's
stock in the corporation.
12. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
13. Id. a t 313.
14. Treas. Reg. Q 1.302-2(b)(l955).
15. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111, 112 (citing Himmell v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d
815 (2d Cir. 1964)).
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these rights may result in a meaningful reduction . . . within the
meaning of Davis and, thus, qualify . . . as not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(l) of the Code."I6 The
value of this analysis is questionable since these three shareholder
rights are reduced in every redemption that does not involve a pro
rata distribution. This analysis does not measure the amount by
which stock ownership rights are reduced nor does it provide any
standard for a minimum "meaningful reduction." Thus, even the
reduction of all three of these rights does not guarantee capital
gain status since the reduction may still not be meaningful.
The term6'meaningful reduction" continues to be elusive
because no per se rule defines the minimum percentage reduction
of ownership required to assure that a redemption does not have
the effect of a dividend." In one extreme situation a taxpayer was
found to have experienced a meaningful reduction in interest
even though his stock ownership only declined from 27% to 22.3%.
The Service ruled that the taxpayer suffered a reduction in his
right to vote, share earnings and profits, and share in net assets
on liquidation. In addition, the taxpayer was no longer able to
control the corporation in concert with another shareholder and,
therefore, was entitled to capital gain treatment.lx It seems clear,
however, that the Commissioner will not find a meaningful reduction in interest if the shareholder owns more than 50% of the
corporate voting power immediately after the transaction.Ig

B. Section 302 Principles Applied to Section 356
Even though the courts generally agree that the dividend
equivalency principles of section 302 provide a useful guideline
for the application of section 356,20these principles are difficult
to apply in the reorganization setting. To determine whether a
stockholder's interest has been meaningfully reduced by a redemption transaction under section 302, the stockholder's postredemption ownership interest is compared with his preredemption
interest in the same c ~ r p o r a t i o n The
. ~ ~ meaningful reduction
16. Id.
17. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 610 (8th Cir. 1973).
18. Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91.
19. The Commissioner has impliedly taken this position on numerous occasions, but
has never specifically declared it. See Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 75-502,
1975-2 C.B. 111; Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
20. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605-07 (8th Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 74-516,
1974-2 C.B.. 121; Cohen, Receipts Related to Corporate Equity: Return on Investment or
Exchange?, 53 TAXES
824, 841 (1975).
21. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
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analysis is more complex, however, in a merger-reorganization
because two or more corporations are involved. Specifically, in
mergers involving boot distributions authorities differ as to
whether the acquired corporation or the acquiring corporation is
considered to redeem the stock and distribute the boot.22The
question is, therefore, whether the meaningful reduction analysis
is to be applied to the shareholder's interest in the acquired corporation or in the acquiring corporation.
In Wright u. United Statesz3the Eighth circuit treated the
boot distribution accompanying a reorganization as having been
made by the acquiring corporation. The court in essence considered all the stock of the acquired corporations to be transferred
to the acquiring corporation, after which a portion of the exchanged stock was redeemed for cash." The meaningful reduction
test was applied in Wright by comparing the shareholder's interest in the acquiring corporation immediately before and after the
distribution of boot.25In other words, the Wright court compared
what would have been the shareholder's stock interest in the acquiring corporation if the merger had been only a stock-for-stock
exchange, with the shareholder's actual interest in the acquiring
corporation following the distribution of boot.
In Revenue Ruling 75-8326the IRS contend* that in reorganizations governed by section 356 the acquired corporation must be
viewed as having made the redemption and distribution. The
Service insists that section 302(b)(l) is to be applied to section
356 by hypothesizing a redemption by the acquired corporation
immediately prior to the reorganization. The IRS therefore applies the meaningful reduction test by comparing the shareholder's interest in the acquired corporation before and after the
redemption.
The conflict between the viewpoints of the Eighth Circuit
and the IRS is crucial, particularly if, as in Shimberg, the redemption involves a pro rata distribution of boot. Under the IRS
approach, every distribution made substantially in proportion to
the shareholders' stock ownership in the acquired corporation is
denied capital gain treatment because there is no meaningful
reduction in each shareholder's proportionate interest? The
--

-

p

p

22. compare Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112 with Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d
600 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
24. Id. at 607.
25. Id.
26. 1975-1 C.B. 112.
27. "The hallmarks of a dividend, then, are pro rata distribution of earnings and
profits and no change in basic shareholder relationships." Himmel v. Commissioner, 338
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Wright approach does not preclude capital gain treatment per se
under these circumstances because the meaningful reduction is
applied in the acquiring corporation context. Since the distribution is made only to those who were shareholders of the acquired
corporation, all others owning stock in the acquiring corporation
prior to the merger do not participate in the boot distribution.
Therefore, the distribution is not pro rata and is not necessarily
considered a dividend.

In Shimberg the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court finding that the distribution did not have
the effect of a dividend distribution under section 356(a)(2).2n But
in so ruling the court did not adopt in its entirety the IRS approach of Revenue Ruling 75-83 nor did it follow the Wright approach. The circuit court concluded the district court erred when
it applied the meaningful reduction test of section 302 to the
It observed that Shimsection 356 distribution in Shirnl~erg.~~
berg's control declined from 66% stock ownership in LSC to less
than 1%ownership in MGIC. Speaking for the court, Judge
Thornberry stated that because the control of small corporation
shareholders will always decline substantially when their corporation is swallowed by a large unrelated one, application of the
meaningful reduction test in that situation would render section
356(a)(2) meaningless. Capital gains would be allowed in every
case where the small corporation shareholder's control is diluted
by merger with a large corporation. Therefore, according to the
court, Shimberg was not an appropriate case for application of
section 302 principle^.^^
The court distinguished Wright on three grounds: (1) two
corporations of similar size merged into a new corporation in
Wright while Shimberg involved a merger of two different corporations of different sizes, (2) the merging corporations in Wright
were commonly owned as opposed to no common ownership in
Shim berg, and (3) Wright consisted of a single boot distribution
to one shareholder versus a pro rata distribution to numerous
shareholders in Shim berg.31
F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964) (emphasis in original). Given the IRS point of view, a pro
rata distribution will always be treated as a dividend.
28. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 290.
29. Id. at 288.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 287.
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In place of the meaningful reduction test of section 302(b)(l),
the circuit court analyzed the facts and circumstances surrounding the cash distribution to determine whether it had the effect
of a dividend. The court reasoned that because a dividend is "a
pro rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation . . .
and a corporate reorganization is a 'continuance of the proprietary interests in the continuing enterprise under modified corporate form,"' a pro rata distribution of boot to a corporation participating in a merger has the effect of a dividend d i s t r i b u t i ~ nIf
.~~
$625,000 cash were distributed to the shareholders prior to, or in
the absence of, a corporate reorganization it would have been
taxed as a dividend. Likewise, the court concluded, this distribution should be treated as a dividend."
The Shimberg court denied its decision contravened the step
transaction doctrine?' It asserted that if the doctrine were applied to defeat the approach taken in Shimberg "it would be
impossible to determine whether the 'boot' distribution had the
effect of the distribution of a dividend."35 The court further
argued that the boot distribution in Shimberg had not been
treated as a separate step?

The Fifth Circuit's reluctance to apply the meaningful reduction test in Shim berg can best be explained by concluding the
court misunderstood the test as applied in Wright. Having considered Shimberg's decline in stock ownership from 66% in LSC
to less than 1%in MGIC, the court concluded the meaningful
reduction test was inappropriate where a small corporation
merges with a large corporation. The shareholders of the small
corporation invariably suffer a meaningful reduction in interest
under the meaningful reduction test as applied in this set of cir32. Id. a t 288 (citing Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949)).
33. Id. at 289.
34. Tax analysis normally requires that a business transaction be separated into
segments for examination. However, unfairness may result if the transaction is divided
into too many parts. The step transaction doctrine has been developed to avoid injustice
by preventing an integrated transaction from being broken into steps or, alternatively, by
requiring that separate steps be considered together for tax.purposes. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U S . 465
(1935); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954). "[Alll
parts of a multi-step exchange or reorganization are grouped together to determine the
appropriate tax treatment for the entire transaction, if the several steps are an essential
and integral part of the overall plan." Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 289.
35. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d at 290.
36. Id.
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cum stance^.^' Unfortunately, this conclusion is the product of a
misinterpretation of the meaningful reduction test applied in
Wright.BX

A. Wright Approach Applied to Shimberg
The Wright approach to the meaningful reduction test presumes an "all stock" merger followed by a postclosing redemption
of the number of shares equivalent to the boot actually distributed. Therefore, under the Wright approach, Shimberg's interest
in MGIC-had he only received MGIC stock in exchange for his
LSC stock-would be compared with his actual interest in MGIC
after the redemption to determine whether his interest had been
meaningfully reduced. Shimberg would have owned 0.458% of the
MGIC stock outstanding if he had received all stock and no
boot? In actuality, following the boot payment Shimberg was left
37. Acceptance of the Wright method as understood by the Fifth Circuit would establish a rule having the opposite effect of the now defunct "automatic dividend" rule. In
Shimberg the Fifth Circuit denied that its decision revived the automatic dividend rule
adhered to by the IRS for many years. Based on loose language in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945), the automatic dividend rule meant that whenever both stock and boot were received in a distribution, all
boot was taxed as dividend to the extent of the stockholder's share in the corporation's
earnings and profits. The rule was finally abandoned in 1974 when the standards of
dividend equivalence of $302(b) were adopted by the IRS as useful guidelines for applying
4 356. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118. The circuit
court believed a contrary decision in Shim berg would have the opposite effect of allowing
capital gains in every merger between corporations of disproportionate size. 577 F.2d a t
290.
38. Shimberg himself led the Fifth Circuit astray by promulgating this misinterpretation. The attorpeys for Shimberg placed great emphasis on language in Wright indicating the Eighth Circuit looked a t the whole of the transaction to determine dividend
equivalence under $ 302(b)(l) and Davis. Brief for Appellee a t 21,22, Shimberg v. United
States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
Consequently, they argued in Shimberg that the taxpayer's 66% stock interest in LSC
should be compared with his less than 1% interest in MGIC. Id. at 12. However, the better
reading of Wright indicates that, although the court also considered the transaction as a
realistic whole, it placed greater weight on analyzing the change in the taxpayer's interest
in the acquiring corporation. Specifically, the Wright court considered the decline in
ownership interest in the acquiring corporation to be from 85% to 61.7%. The Eighth
Circuit concluded that this 23.3% reduction in interest was meaningful. Wright v. United
States, 482 F.2d at 609-10.
39. The merger agreement called for a total exchange of MGIC voting common stock
valued a t $3,750,000 and cash amounting to $625,000 for all of the outstanding shares of
LSC. The market value of a share of MGIC stock a t the time of the merger was $58.35.
Brief for Appellee a t 24 n.9, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979). At the time of the merger, Shimberg
received, in exchange for his LSC stock, 21,461 shares of MGIC stock and $417,449 in cash.
Shimberg had no interest a t the time of the merger in an additional 21,461 shares placed
in escrow, such interest being entirely a future interest dependent on the postmerger
earnings of the LSC business. Assuming that Shimberg's cash consideration had been
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with only 0.344%of the stock outstanding." Properly applied, the
Wright method shows the boot distribution to have reduced
Shimberg's interest from 0.458%to 0.344% instead of from 66%
to 1%as erroneously derived by the court in Shimberg. Had the
Fifth Circuit correctly applied the section 302 principles adopted
in Wright, the court could have found that the boot distribution
in Shimberg did cause a meaningful reduction; therefore it did
not have the effect of a dividend and was a capital gain."
received in stock, he would have obtained an additional 7,154 shares of MGIC stock
($417,449 i$58.35) for a total of 28,615 (21,461 plus 7,154) shares.
Prior to the merger, 6,204,448 shares of MGIC stock were issued and outstanding. An
additional 32,132 shares were issued to the LSC stockholders a t the time of the merger,
for a total of 6,236,580 shares issued and outstanding. Had the $625,000 cash consideration
been exchanged as stock in the merger, 10,711 more shares would have been issued to the
LSC stockholders ($625,000 i $58.35) for a total of 6,247,291 MGIC shares issued and
outstanding.
The calculations demonstrating Shimberg's percentage of ownership follow.
Shimberg's Percentage Ownership After the Merger:

MGIC shares owned by Shimberg
(21,461) plus 7,154 shares
28,615 - equivalent to cash
6,247,291 Issued and outstanding MGIC
stock (6,236, 580) plus 10,711
shares equivalent to cash

= 0.458%

See id.
40. Shimbergk Percentage Ownership After the Merger and After a Redemption of
His Stock Equivalent to Cash Received in theMerger:

MGIC shares owned by Shimberg
(28,615) less 7,154 shares
21,461 - equivalent to cash
6,236,580 - Issued and outstanding MGIC
stock (6,247,291) less 10,711
shares equivalent to cash

= 0.3441%

See id.
41. The decline of Shimberg's stock ownership from 0.458% to 0.344% represents a
25% reduction and would most likely qualify Shimberg for capital gain treatment under
the 8 302(b)(l) meaningful reduction test. See also Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92
(shareholder allowed capital gain treatment when his percentage of stock ownership was
reduced from 0.0001118% to 0.0001081%).
Alternatively, Shimberg could be found to qualify for .capital gains through the 5
302(b)(2)substantially disproportionate redemption test. Although no court has ever applied 4 302(b)(2) to 8 356, it appears the Eighth Circuit would have applied it had the
taxpayer in Wright qualified. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d a t 608. If 5 302(b)(2) is
considered to be a specific example of 5 302(b)(l), then paragraph (2) can be deemed
applicable to 8 356 since paragraph (1) is pari materia with 5 356. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1954).
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B. IRS Approach Applied to Shimberg
Although the Fifth Circuit rejected the Wright approach, it
did not directly adopt the method advanced by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 75-83.42Under the IRS approach the section 302(b)(l)
meaningful reduction test would be applied to compare Shimberg's interest in the acquired corporation (LSC) prior to the
merger with his interest in LSC as though LSC paid the boot in
redemption of the stock before effecting the merger with MGIC.
Since the boot distribution was pro rata to all the shareholders
in LSC, Shimberg's proportionate interest in LSC remained constant at 66% even though the number of shares he owned was
reduced. The IRS would assert that Shimberg's interest was not
meaningfully reduced within the meaning of Davis; therefore, he
p
p

-

-

Assuming an "all stock" merger and a postclosing redemption of the number of
Shimberg's shares equivalent to the cash he actually received, all as contemplated by
Wright, Shimberg suffered a substantially disproportionate redemption within the meaning of Q 302(b)(2). A redemption is subtantially disproportionate if (a) the shareholder's
postredemption interest in the corporation is less than 80% of his preredemption interest
and (b) the shareholder owns less than 50% of the corporation's voting power after the
redemption. Calculations can demonstrate the satisfaction of Q 302(b)(2):
(a) Shim berg's Percentage Ownership After the Merger:

MGIC shares owned by Shimberg

(21,461) plus 7,154 shares
28,615 - equivalent to cash
6,247;291 Issued and outstanding MGIC
stock (6,236,580) plus 10,711
shares equivalent to cash

= 0.458%

(b) Shimberg's Perce'ntage Ownership After the Merger and After a Redemption
of His Stock Equivalent to Cash:

MGIC shares owned by Shimberg
(28,615) less 7,154 shares
21,461 - equivalent to cash
6,236,580 - Issued and outstanding MGIC
Stock (6,247,291) less 10,711
shares equivalent to cash

= 0.3441%

of Shimberg's Ownership Position Prior to the Redemption (0.458%):
(c)
0.80 x 0.00458 = 0.366%
(d) Shimberg's subsequent ownership position (0.3441%) is less than 0.366%
(80% of his prior ownership position) and, furthermore, is less than 50% of
MGIC's total voting power.
(e) Thus, Q 302(b)(2) is satisfied.
See Brief for Appellee a t 24 n.9, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
42. 1975-1 C.B. 112.

CASE NOTE

should be taxed as receiving ordinary income because the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend.

C. Shimberg Test for Dividend Equivalency
Instead of applying the meaningful reduction test in
Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the effect of the boot to
determine whether the distribution should be deemed to have the
effect of a dividend.43As described above, the court concluded
that under the Shimberg facts section 356(a)(2) requires a determination whether the distribution would have been taxed as a
dividend if made prior to, or in the absence of, a reorganization.
The Fifth Circuit has, unwittingly perhaps, adopted the bottom
line of Revenue Ruling 75-83. Determinaion of the tax consequences of a distribution without regard to the reorganization is
the same as analyzing a boot distribution in which the acquired
corporation is presumed to have redeemed the stock and distributed the boot. Although the Fifth Circuit appears to apply a new
test, the circuit court has actually employed the meaningful reduction test as interpreted by the IRS.
The test for dividend equivalency applied by Shimberg and
Revenue Ruling 75-83 distorts reality. The test ignores the fact
the reorganization is part of the transaction and absent the reorganization the distribution would in all likelihood not have been
made. Furthermore, the fact the acquiring corporation generally
provides the cash for boot distributions requires that the role of
the acquiring corporation be considered in the tax analysis."
Even if the acquired corporation possessed the necessary funds to
redeem the stock, it would probably retain the funds as working
capital were it not for the merger.
Although the Fifth Circuit expressly denied it, the court's
disregard of the reorganization in its analysis of whether the distribution would have been taxed as a dividend violates the step
transaction doctrine. That doctrine precludes the court from
viewing Shimberg as a constructive redemption by the acquired
company (LSC) followed by an entirely separate reorganization.
By separating the hypothetical redemption from the reorganization, the court ignores both the acquiring corporation and the
e hinted its rejection of the
transaction's overall r e ~ u l t . ~ T hcourt
43. 577 F.2d at 288-89.
44. As of the time of the merger, LSC had cash of approximately $147,000. Brief for
Appellee at 31 n.14, Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
45. The Wright method at least considers the continuity of shareholder interest from
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step transaction argument stems from the close relationship the
argument bears to the premise that the meaningful reduction test
is appropriate in Shim berg.46 Having rejected the meaningful reduction test without understanding it, the court uses that erroneously based determination to deny application of step transaction principles.
The unfairness of the Shim berg decision can be illustrated by
hypothesizing a merger in which no boot is paid, but later (sufficiently distant to avoid the effects of the step transaction doctrine) the acquiring corporation meaningfully reduces the proportionate interests of the shareholders of the acquired corporation
by redeeming a portion of their stock. The Shimberg taxpayer
whose receipt of boot is a part of the reorganization is found to
have realized ordinary income, while the taxpayer in the delayed
redemption escapes with capital gain.
IV. CONCLUSION
In deciding Shimberg, the Fifth Circuit has created a split
in the circuits. Unfortunately the court thought the meaningful
reduction test as applied in Wright would have created an
"automatic capital gain" rule for mergers of small corporations
into large corporations. As a result the real merits of that test, as
applied to the facts of the instant case, were never considered.
Consequently the Shimberg court generally rejected the Wright
approach to determining dividend equivalency and unwittingly
gave support to the IRS position in Revenue Ruling 75-83.
The Shimberg decision lends credence to the IRS' position
that any pro rata distribution of boot incident to a reorganization
automatically has the effect of the distribution of a dividendmd7
Because the Shimberg decision does not follow Wright, nor convincingly distinguish or refute it, the result in Shimberg is wholly
unsatisfactory. Instead of shedding greater light on the conflicts
surrounding the interrelationship of sections 302 and 356, the
Fifth Circuit has only succeeded in adding to the confusion.
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the acquired corporation to the acquiring corporation by treating the latter entity as
making the distribution. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
46. 577 F.2d at 290.
47. This results in a partial revival of the "automatic dividend" rule referred to in
note 37 supra.

